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ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN
INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ LITIGATION
FIRAT CENGIZ*
Abstract This article aims to draw policy lessons from the American
indirect purchasers’ litigation experience for the design of the European
private antitrust regime in the light of the European Commission’s White
Paper on damages actions. The article shows that in multi-level polities
procedural aspects of antitrust litigation and judicial cooperation are as
crucial as the substantive standards for the success of private enforcement
regimes. From this perspective the article criticizes the White Paper for
the lack of procedural assessment and urges the Commission to give
due consideration to procedural standards and mechanisms of judicial
cooperation before taking any legislative action.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compensation of victims of antitrust violations, most notably of consumers,
through damages actions deters anticompetitive behaviour, corrects harmful
effects of such behaviour on consumer welfare, and consequently constitutes
an essential pillar of modern antitrust regimes.1 Realizing these benefits of
private antitrust enforcement, the European Commission has been actively
seeking ways to invigorate antitrust damages actions before the national courts
and to establish a European private enforcement regime.
In 2004, the Modernisation Regulation decentralized the enforcement of
European Union (EU) competition law by transforming article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) into a legal
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1 AI Gavil, ‘Federal Judicial Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional Direct and
Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation’ (2000) 69 George Washington Law Review 860. However
for discussion of the desirability of private enforcement from the public policy perspective see CA
Jones, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check’ (2004) 27
World Competition 13; contrast WPJ Wils, ‘Should Private Enforcement be Encouraged in
Europe?’ (2003) 26 World Competition 473.
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exception rule2 and granting the national courts as well as the national com-
petition authorities the power to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU in their
entirety.3 Nevertheless, decentralization has not engendered the expected en-
thusiasm for private antitrust enforcement. For instance, the Ashurst Study
conducted shortly after decentralization depicts the current stance of private
enforcement in Europe as one of ‘astonishing diversity and total under-
development’.4 In order to attract the attention of the European antitrust
community to the matter, and to assess various strategies to vitalize private
antitrust enforcement, the Commission published a Green Paper on damages
actions in 2005.5 After three years of discussion process, the Commission
finally published its widely expected White Paper on damages actions in April
2008.6
The Green Paper had concluded that the failure of private antitrust en-
forcement in Europe was largely due to various legal and procedural hurdles
in the national laws governing actions for antitrust damages before national
courts.7 In its White Paper, the Commission sets ambitious goals for the future
direction of private antitrust enforcement in Europe and proposes bold actions
to address those legal and procedural hurdles. The White Paper opens with
proclaiming that ‘full compensation’ of all victims of infringements of EU
competition law will be the ‘first and foremost guiding principle’ of private
enforcement in Europe.8 In order to achieve the goal of full compensation, the
Commission proposes recognition of both indirect purchaser standing and a
passing-on defence through legislative action at the EU level.9 Additionally,
in order to overcome litigation costs which are a disincentive to consumers to
bring damages actions, and to enhance the choice for individuals between
various alternative types of litigation, the Commission proposes strengthening
of representative, collective and individual damages actions through EU
legislation.10
2 Ex art 81(3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty); Council
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the application of arts 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty (hereinafter the ‘Modernisation Regulation’) [2003] OJ L 1/1, art 1.
3 Ex arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty; ibid art 6.
4 Ashurst, ‘Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages of Infringement of EC
Competition Rules, Comparative Report’ (hereinafter the ‘Comparative Report’) (31 August
2004) 1.
5 Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’
(hereinafter the ‘Green Paper’), COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005.
6 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust
rules’ (hereinafter the ‘White Paper’) COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008.
7 ibid 2. 8 ibid 3.
9 European Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper’ (hereinafter
the ‘Staff Working Paper’) SEC(2008) 404, 2.4.2008, 66–67, 98; Commission (EC), ‘Staff
Working Document Accompanying document to the White Paper, Impact Assessment’ (herein-
after the ‘Impact Assessment Report’) SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008, 57.
10 White Paper (n 6) 4; Staff Working Paper, ibid 19–21, 98; Impact Assessment Report,
ibid 57.
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The Commission’s choice of compensation of victims, particularly con-
sumers, as the ultimate goal of private enforcement is most welcome as this
choice closely parallels the underlying rationale of modern antitrust philo-
sophy, namely protection of consumer welfare. The legislative measures pro-
posed by the Commission, on the other hand, seem to be well suited to serve
the goal of full compensation. However, given that an anticompetitive beha-
viour must affect trade between theMember States in order for articles 101 and
102 TFEU to apply, violations of EU competition law cause damages to con-
sumers and other direct and indirect purchasers located in various parts of the
EU. Under these circumstances, the Commission’s proposals potentially open
the door for the very same anticompetitive behaviour being litigated before
various national courts through alternative types of damages actions brought
by indirect and direct purchasers. This in turn raises fundamental questions of
consistent judicial application of EU competition law11 and prevention of
multiple recovery of the same antitrust damages. If the Commission’s propo-
sals are adopted, judicial cooperation and coordinated litigation of related
cases will gain crucial importance for the protection of consistency and pre-
vention of multiple recoveries. Nevertheless, the White Paper remains silent
when it comes to the procedural aspects of private enforcement.
In the White Paper, the Commission declares that ‘the legal framework for
more effective antitrust damages actions should be based on a genuinely
European approach’.12 However, such an approach does not necessarily pre-
clude policy learning from other jurisdictions. With more than a century of
private enforcement tradition, the US antitrust enforcement regime undoubt-
edly provides many valuable lessons, both positive and negative, for the de-
sign of private enforcement in Europe. In 2002, an Antitrust Modernization
Commission was formed in the US to study the federal antitrust regime in
general,13 including the substantive and procedural aspects of private en-
forcement. In its final report, which was published in 2007, the Modernization
Commission proposed important amendments to the current federal policy of
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing.14 These proposals by the
Modernization Commission imply that a trial and error process has taken place
in the US private enforcement regime, and from a pragmatic point of view, this
11 In the context of this article consistent judicial application does not refer to uniform in-
terpretation of articles 101 and 102 TFEU which is sustained through the preliminary rulings
mechanism under article 267 TFEU. Rather, ‘inconsistency’ is used here to mean inconsistency
between national courts as to whether or not to award damages or as regards the amount of
awarded damages in related antitrust damages actions. Such inconsistency may emerge because of
the application of different standards or because, while applying the same standard, different
conclusions are reached regarding the interpretation of technical aspects of damage actions such
as the calculation of passing-on. 12 White Paper (n 6) 3.
13 Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107–273, ·· 11051–60, 116
Stat. 1856.
14 Antitrust Modernization Commission, ‘Report and Recommendations’ (hereinafter the
‘AMC Final Report’) (April 2007) <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/
amc_final_report.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009.
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process deserves analysis for the purpose of drawing policy lessons for Europe.
As explained in detail below, the current initiative for policy change in the US
was not provoked by a shift in legal and economic understanding but rather
by the diversity between federal and state standards and the lack of effective
judicial cooperation mechanisms, which together have produced a chaotic
litigation environment. The US experience of indirect purchasers’ litigation
illustrates that in multi-level polities, particularly where there is diversity be-
tween the standards applied by constituent jurisdictions, the procedural aspects
of antitrust damages actions and judicial cooperation mechanisms prove as
important as the substantive standards for the success of a private enforcement
regime. From this perspective, the White Paper’s silence regarding the pro-
cedural aspects of damages actions appears a strategic mistake.
This article starts with a brief explanation of the law and economics of the
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing. It continues with analysis
of the US experience of indirect purchaser litigation and the raison d’être of
the current initiative for policy change. Current substantive and procedural
standards in Europe are then analysed in the light of the lessons drawn from
the US experience. In terms of substantive standards, the article finds only
little clarification at the EU level and significant diversity at the national level
regarding indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. Likewise,
the article finds that under the current EU standards of jurisdiction and conflict
of laws the very same anticompetitive behaviour might be litigated before
different national courts under different standards. On the other hand, current
mechanisms of judicial cooperation do not appear strong and sophisticated
enough to support coordinated litigation of related cases to prevent incon-
sistent application and multiple recoveries. In other words, the article finds
that similar circumstances to those which engendered a policy failure in the
US currently exist in Europe. Consequently, the article concludes by calling
on the European Commission to give due consideration to possible strategies
for the improvement of current procedural standards and judicial cooperation
mechanisms before taking any legislative action.
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PASSING-ON
All products pass through a production chain before they reach the final con-
sumers. When market forces are superseded in any level of this production
chain by anticompetitive behaviour, all customers below that level, including
final consumers, may face higher prices and scarce output.
In a very simple example of a production chain consisting of a manufac-
turer, a retailer and a final consumer, when the manufacturer engages in an
anticompetitive activity and subsequently raises his prices, in the first instance
the retailer bears the anticompetitive overcharge. Then, when selling the
product to the final consumer, the retailer faces a choice between different
pricing options. Depending on the market conditions, and most importantly on
42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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the price elasticity of demand, the retailer may: absorb the whole overcharge
and not reflect it in the prices he charges to the final consumer; pass the whole
overcharge to the final consumer by raising the price accordingly; or absorb a
part of the overcharge and pass the rest to the final consumer.
In an ideal world, we would expect the private enforcement regime to
provide mechanisms whereby both direct purchasers (in the above example
the retailer) and indirect purchasers (in the above example the consumer) can
claim damages to cover their exact individual economic injuries caused by the
anticompetitive activity. This requires recognition of both the passing-on de-
fence and indirect purchaser standing. When the passing-on defence is avail-
able, in damages actions brought by direct purchasers the defendants may
escape liability upon arguing and successfully proving that direct purchasers
have raised their prices responding to the anticompetitive overcharge and
subsequently passed the damages on to their customers. When indirect pur-
chaser standing is recognized, indirect as well as direct purchasers may sue the
undertakings engaged in anticompetitive activity for damages and the damage
award is apportioned by the judiciary between these clusters of plaintiffs
based on the proven amount of passing-on.
As has been argued elsewhere, the design of individual elements of a pri-
vate antitrust enforcement regime involves three essential legal and economic
considerations:
1) The fairness consideration which requires that every individual including
the final consumer is granted access to legal process to claim damages
in order to make good any injury they have incurred as a result of anti-
competitive behaviour,
2) The effectiveness consideration which requires that deterrence of anti-
competitive behaviour is recognised as one of the ultimate goals of
antitrust damages actions and consequently individual elements of the
private enforcement regime are designed to accomplish this objective,
3) Last but not the least, the efficiency consideration which requires that




Diagram 1: Example of a production chain.
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an overwhelming burden of economic and factual analysis on the
judiciary.15
When it comes to the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing, the
consideration of fairness comes into an unavoidable conflict with the con-
siderations of effectiveness and efficiency. Fairness requires recognition of
both the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing so that each
cluster of plaintiffs would be able to sue the undertakings involved in anti-
competitive activity for damages and subsequently, the compensation would
be distributed between those clusters based on the amount of passing-on. In
this scenario, each cluster of plaintiffs would have access to damages and no
cluster would receive any windfall benefits at the expense of the other.
Nevertheless, recognition of the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser
standing raises some impediments to effectiveness and efficiency. When the
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing is recognized, successful
utilization of the passing-on defence by the defendants would leave the final
consumers as the only cluster capable of claiming damages. However, final
consumers are believed to be less effective plaintiffs than the direct pur-
chasers. Firstly, although anticompetitive behaviour causes great economic
damage to consumer welfare in general, individual consumers suffer only a
very small portion of such damage. Secondly, compared to direct purchasers,
indirect purchasers enjoy only limited financial means to support the costs of
antitrust litigation. Thirdly, as they stand closer in the production chain to the
undertakings engaged in anticompetitive activity, direct purchasers benefit
from an information advantage, and therefore are believed to be more likely to
bring substantial economic evidence before the courts in damages actions.16
15 F Cengiz, ‘Passing on Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages
against the Violations of Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US?’ (2007) ESRC
Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper 07-21 <http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/
1.104616!ccp07-21.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009, 8. See also V Sarris, The Efficiency of
Private Antitrust Enforcement: The Illinois Brick Decision (Garland Publishing, New York and
London 1984) 117; Gavil (n 1) 860; BD Richman & CR. Murray, ‘Rebuilding the Illinois Brick: a
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule’ (2007) Duke Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series 155, 3.
16 However, such close relationship between the undertakings involved in anticompetitive
activity may also create disincentives for the direct purchasers to bring antitrust damages actions
and impede the effectiveness of a private enforcement regime. Firstly, in some cases, particularly
when the upstream market is concentrated, and therefore when they rely on supplies from the
undertakings involved in anticompetitive activity, direct purchasers might not be willing to dis-
turb their relationship with their suppliers by bringing a damages claim. In such cases indirect
purchasers may prove more effective plaintiffs than the direct purchasers. It has also been proven
that the upstream firms are capable of sharing the anticompetitive profit with the purchasers
through a tacit sustainable agreement to curb their incentives to sue: See MP Schinkel, J Tuinstra,
J Ruggeberg, ‘Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion’ (2005)
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper 2005-02<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=730384> accessed 28 September 2009. For empirical analysis of the
effects of indirect and direct purchaser damages actions on the effectiveness of private enforce-
ment regime see ES Snyder, ‘Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages’
(1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 469; JM Joyce and RH McGuckin, ‘Assignment of
44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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As a result, compared to direct purchasers, final consumers appear as an ato-
mized and diffused group with weaker incentives to sue and therefore, it is
questionable whether indirect purchaser damages actions are capable of
creating a credible threat against anticompetitive behaviour.17 Additionally,
recognition of the indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence re-
quires analysis by the court ex post of complex economic facts, most notably
pricing decisions and price elasticity of demand. It should also be noted that in
the real world production chains are much more complex than the simple three
level example given above. In some cases, one product becomes a component
of the other rendering it extremely difficult for the courts even to identify the
direct and indirect purchasers. Therefore, it is argued that recognition of the
indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence would render already
complex antitrust litigation extremely burdensome and seriously disturb judi-
cial economy.18 Due to such conflicts between the considerations of fairness,
efficiency and effectiveness, each jurisdiction faces some policy choices be-
tween the recognition and rejection of passing-on defence and indirect pur-
chaser standing when designing its private antitrust enforcement regime.19
This policy decision depends on whether fairness or effectiveness and effici-
ency is perceived as the main objective of private enforcement in that juris-
diction. Therefore, although they appear substantial from the perspective of
fairness, passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing might be limited
or even rejected in some jurisdictions as a strategic policy choice.
III. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF THE PASSING-ON DEFENCE AND INDIRECT
PURCHASER STANDING
Section 4 of the Clayton Act declares that ‘any person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
Right to Sue under Illinois Brick: An Empirical Assessment’ (1986) 31 Antitrust Bulletin Spring
235.
17 WM Landes and RA Posner, ‘Should Indirect Purchasers have Standing to Sue under the
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick’ (1979) 46 University of
Chicago Law Review 602; G Werden and M Schwartz, ‘Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of
Antitrust Violations—An Economic Analysis’ (1984) 35 Hastings Law Journal 629. Contrast RG
Harris and LA Sullivan, ‘Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analysis’ (1980) 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 269. Many jurisdictions design
collective redress mechanisms such as class actions or damages actions brought by public bodies
in order to overcome such weaknesses of consumer damages actions. However, besides their
benefits those mechanisms involve certain costs, disadvantages and complications as well.
Substantive analysis of collective redress mechanisms is outside the scope of this article. For a
broad overview of the American private antitrust regime from this perspective see F Cengiz, ‘The
Role of State AGs in the US Antitrust Policy: Public Enforcement Through Private Enforcement
Methods’ (2006) ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper 06-19 <http://
www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104496!ccp06-19.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009.
18 Landes and Posner (n 17).
19 For the analysis of such options, see Green Paper (n 5) Options 21–24.
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may sue’ to obtain treble damages (emphasis added). In other words, the US
federal law does not restrict standing in antitrust damages actions to any class
of plaintiffs per se. However, since the foundational period of the US private
enforcement regime, the Supreme Court has restricted standing in antitrust
damages actions for various policy reasons. In the earlier jurisprudence, the
Court attempted to address the issues of passing-on defence and indirect
purchaser standing from the perspective of ‘remoteness’ of the injury from the
violation. This early approach produced inconsistent judgments and lack of
clarification and guidance for the lower courts.20
The Supreme Court faced the question of passing-on specifically for
the first time in Hanover Shoe,21 an antitrust damages action brought by a
shoe producer against the supplier of the machines used in shoe production. In
this case, the defendant raised the passing-on defence by arguing that the
plaintiff should not be entitled to claim any damages, as he had passed the
overcharge on to his customers. The Court approached the question of
passing-on mainly from an effectiveness and efficiency standpoint. Firstly, the
Court observed that pricing decisions of undertakings are highly in-
dividualized and influenced by a wide range of factors which are extremely
difficult to analyse ex post.22 Recognition of the passing-on defence would
require analysis of ‘virtually unascertainable figures’ and such a task would
prove ‘insurmountable’ for the courts.23 Secondly, the Court observed that
recognition of the passing-on defence would automatically leave the final
consumers as the only group of plaintiffs entitled to claim damages. In such
case antitrust damages actions ‘would be substantially reduced in effective-
ness’ as final consumers generally ‘have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little
interest in attempting a class action’.24 On these grounds, the Court rejected
the passing-on defence.
A few years later, in Illinois Brick,25 the Supreme Court faced the question
of indirect purchaser standing which constitutes the other side of the coin. In
this case, the State of Illinois, which bought bricks from masonry contractors
as an indirect purchaser, sued the brick producers for damages caused as a
result of a price-fixing conspiracy. In its analysis the Court observed that
‘whatever rule is to be adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust actions, it must
apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants’,26 because if indirect purchaser
standing were to be recognized in the absence of the passing-on defence, the
result would be multiple recovery of the same damages by both direct
and indirect purchasers. Therefore, the Court was ‘faced with the choice of
20 EE Pollock, ‘Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine’ (1966) 32
Antitrust Law Journal 5. Compare Keogh v Chicago & NW Ry 245 US 531 (1918); Ohio Valley
Electric Corp v General Electric Co 244 F Supp 914 (SDNY 1965) and Commonwealth Edison v
Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co. 315 F 2d 564 (7th Cir 1963).
21 Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corp 392 US 481 (1968).
22 ibid 492–93. 23 ibid 493. 24 ibid 494.
25 Illinois Brick Co v Illinois 431 US 720 (1977). 26 ibid 728.
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overruling (or narrowly limiting) Hanover Shoe or of applying it to bar
respondents’ attempts to use pass-on theory offensively’.27 Again, the Court
approached the matter exclusively from the perspective of effectiveness and
efficiency, observing that ‘the antitrust laws [would] be more effectively en-
forced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct
purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the
overcharge’ to bring damages actions.28 Secondly, taking an efficiency pers-
pective, the Court referred to Hanover Shoe and once again mentioned the
complex economic analysis of passing-on which would render already com-
plicated antitrust damages actions completely unmanageable.29 Consequently,
the Court established that indirect purchasers were not entitled to bring da-
mages actions in cases of violations of federal antitrust law.
TheHanover Shoe and Illinois Brick decisions of the Supreme Court caused
an immediate public reaction and an intense debate within the antitrust com-
munity since their practical effect was denial of redress to final consumers.
Since the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick judgments, various bills have been
proposed unsuccessfully to Congress for their legislative overruling.30
Powerful interest groups such as the American Bar Association produced
numerous reports on the matter.31 However, the strongest resistance to the
denial of indirect purchaser standing at the federal level came from the states.
In the US, the industrialized northern states in particular enjoy a substantial
antitrust enforcement tradition with state antitrust statutes predating the
27 ibid. The sequence of cases played a dramatic role in the development of American federal
policy on the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing. As Justice Blackmun observed
in his dissent, ‘the plaintiffs-respondents in this case . . . [were] the victims of an unhappy
chronology’: see Illinois Brick, ibid, (Blackmun, J dissenting), 765. See also AI Gavil, ‘Antitrust
Remedy Wars Episode I: Illinois Brick from Inside the Supreme Court’ (2005) 79 St. John’s Law
Review 553.
28 Illinois Brick (n 25) 734–735. Illinois Brick is also perceived as one of the series of cases
where the Court established Chicago School rationales into federal antitrust jurisprudence such as
Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc 433 US 36 (1977) holding that vertical territorial
restrictions are not illegal per se and Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc 429 US 477
(1977) establishing the ‘antitrust injury’ standard. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s exclusive
effectiveness perspective in Illinois Brick is explained as an effect of the Chicago School
philosophy: see EC Cavanaugh, ‘Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead’ (2004) 17
Loyola Consumer Law Review 1, 17; Gavil (n 1), 865–866.
29 Illinois Brick, ibid 734–735.
30 See eg HR 1942, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (1978); S 1874, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (1978); HR 9132,
95th Cong, 1st Sess (1977); HR 8516, 95th Cong, 1st Sess (1977); HR 8359, 95th Cong, 1st Sess
(1977); HR 2004, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (1979); HR 2060, 96th Cong 1st Sess (1979); S 300, 96th
Cong, 1st Sess. (1979).
31 ‘Report of the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Task Force on Legislative
Alternatives concerning Illinois Brick Co v Illinois’ (1997) 46 Antitrust Law Journal 1137;
‘Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review
Proposed Legislation to Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick’ (1983) 52 Antitrust Law Journal 841;
‘Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the
Supreme Court’s Decision in California v ARC America Corp.’ (1990) 59 Antitrust Law Journal
273; ‘Report of the Indirect Purchaser Task Force, Section of Antitrust Law American Bar
Association’ (1995) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 993.
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federal ones in some cases.32 Additionally, consumer redress through antitrust
damages actions is a politically sensitive matter for the states. The State
Attorneys General, who are the chief legal officers of the states and elected
through popular voting in most states, are entitled to bring antitrust damages
actions on behalf of consumers under the federal and most of the state laws.33
Additionally, in terms of their economic functions, the states themselves
generally occupy the position of indirect purchaser in the production chain and
therefore may be the victims of antitrust violations.34 For these reasons, the
federal policy of eliminating indirect purchaser standing came into direct
conflict with state interests. As a response, the states turned to state laws, the
most powerful weapon in their arsenal. To date, most states denied the Illinois
Brick doctrine either by adopting the so-called ‘Illinois Brick repealler sta-
tutes’, which specifically recognize indirect purchaser standing in antitrust
damages actions before the state courts, or through jurisprudence.35
In addition to substantial divergence between federal and state laws with
respect to indirect purchaser standing, state laws inter se also differ drama-
tically. For instance, whereas some states recognize direct standing of indivi-
dual consumers, others grant the authority to bring damages actions on behalf
of consumers to the State Attorneys General.36 Likewise, whereas the passing-
on defence is available in some states, others simply allow multiple recovery
of the same damages by direct and indirect purchasers.37 This immense di-
versity between the federal and state standards and state standards inter se has
resulted in an environment of litigation disorder and forum shopping where
the very same anticompetitive activity produces damages actions before
various federal and state courts. For instance, public proceedings against
Microsoft under Section II of the Sherman Act produced 64 follow-on da-
mages actions before the federal courts and 117 follow-on damages actions
before the state courts.38
32 JA Rahl, ‘Towards a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy’ (1960) 39 Texas Law Review 753,
753–54; GF Sieker, ‘The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement-Some Views and
Observations’ (1960) 39 Texas Law Review 873; S Mosk, ‘State Antitrust Enforcement and
Coordination With Federal Enforcement’ (1962) 21 Antitrust Law Journal 358; J May, ‘The Role
of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust History’
(1990) 59 Antitrust Law Journal 93, 98.
33 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-435, 15 USCA · 18(a).
34 Cengiz (n 15) 19.
35 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Indirect Purchaser Litigation
Handbook (American Bar Association, 2007) 26; R Folsom, ‘Indirect Purchasers: State Antitrust
Remedies and Roadblocks’ (2005) 50 Antitrust Bulletin 181, 182; KJ O’Connor, ‘Is the Illinois
Brick Wall Crumbling?’ (2001) 15 ANTITRUST 34; JT. Tomlin, DJ Giali, ‘Federalism and the
Indirect Purchaser Mess’ (2005) 11 George Mason Law Review 157. Although in California v
ARC America Corp 490 US 93 (1989) it was argued that state indirect purchaser laws have been
preempted by the federal law, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.
36 American Bar Association ibid 26; Folsom ibid.
37 American Bar Association ibid.
38 Gavil (n 1) 863; RW Davis, ‘Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come
Home Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall’ (1996) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 375, 396; JT
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Needless to say, in addition to resulting in enormous litigation costs
particularly for the defendants, this litigation chaos raises very real risks
of inconsistent judicial application of antitrust laws and multiple recovery
of the same antitrust damages through parallel damages actions. Under such
diversity of substantive standards, removal of related cases to a single forum
and/or coordinated adjudication of related cases by multiple forums appear
as the only mechanisms for avoiding inconsistency and multiple recovery.
Unfortunately however, the US procedural law does not provide any strong
mechanism for judicial cooperation. Removal and consolidation of related
state cases are governed by individual state procedural laws which are
as diverse as the federal ones.39 On the other hand, federal procedural law
allows removal of state cases to the federal courts only under two circum-
stances: firstly, when the state case involves a federal question40 which is
a priori not satisfied in indirect purchaser damages actions due to diverging
federal and state policies regarding this matter; and secondly, when ‘diversity
jurisdiction’ exists.41 Diversity jurisdiction is deemed by federal law to
exist under very strict conditions such as diverse citizenship of all class rep-
resentatives from the defendants in terms of their state of residence, and
fulfilment of the minimum amount in dispute requirement (currently slightly
more than US$75,000).42 Although Congress passed the Class Action Fairness
Act43 in 2005 in order to relax the conditions of diversity jurisdiction in
class actions, this Act is not expected to dramatically ameliorate antitrust
litigation disorder due to the various exceptions it brings to the new standard
of diversity jurisdiction.44 More substantially, however, the Act does not
harmonize federal and state standards of the passing-on defence and indirect
purchaser standing. In other words, even if related federal and state cases
are successfully consolidated before a single federal forum, they continue
to be litigated under diverse standards.45 Under these circumstances, coordi-
nation of related federal and state, and various state cases depends on the
voluntary efforts of the parties and the courts. In the past, parties in antitrust
damages actions entered into agreements for the consolidation of pre-trial
proceedings before a single state forum and coordinated litigation of related
Prud’Homme, Jr, ES Cooper, ‘One More Challenge for the AMC: Repairing the Legacy of the
Illinois Brick’ (2005) 40 University of San Francisco Law Review 675, 676.
39 Cengiz (n 15) 22. 40 28 USC 1367.
41 28 USC 1332 (a).
42 ibid. See also Ben-Hur v Cauble 255 US 356 (1921); Zahn v International Paper Co 414 US
291 (1973); Exxon Mobil v Allapath Services, Inc 125 U.S. 2511 (2005).
43 28 USC ·· 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715.
44 Professor WB Rubenstein, UCLA Program on Class Actions, ‘Understanding the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005’ <http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis.pdf> ac-
cessed 28 September 2009, 2.
45 Cavanaugh (n 28) 47–48; AMC Final Report (n 14) 271; Testimony of Mark J Bennett and
Ellen S Cooper before the Antitrust Modernization Commission (17 June 2005), 15; Prepared
Statement of Professor Andrew I Gavil, before the Antitrust Modernization Commission (27 June
2005) 22.
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state cases.46 Likewise, in damages actions brought on behalf of consumers,
State Attorneys General vigorously coordinate their efforts under the frame-
work of the National Association of State Attorneys General.47 Nevertheless,
such voluntary cooperation initiated only occasionally and by the consent of
both sides of the conflict does not always prove effective as the Microsoft
example mentioned above clearly illustrates.
In 2002 an Antitrust Modernization Commission was formed in the US to
assess the federal antitrust policy in general and report back proposals for
amendment to the President.48 Due to the current litigation disorder in anti-
trust damages actions, the Commission decided at the outset to include the
matter of indirect purchaser damages actions on its agenda. The US Supreme
Court and the American antitrust community approached the matters of the
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing mainly from the perspec-
tive of efficiency and effectiveness. The Commission too followed this ap-
proach and expressed in its final report that due to their superiority from the
perspectives of efficiency and effectiveness, the Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick doctrines would still represent the best policy options if things were to
be written on a ‘clean slate’.49 Nevertheless, owing to the diversity between
standards and the lack of effective judicial cooperation mechanisms, the cur-
rent situation could best be described as a ‘lack of policy’.50 Despite the denial
of standing under federal law, indirect purchasers have access to the private
enforcement regime under state laws, and indirect and direct purchaser da-
mages actions regarding the same anticompetitive activity are independently
litigated before multiple forums at the expense of consistency and judicial eco-
nomy.51 Under these circumstances, ironically, the Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick doctrines seem to seriously impede the effectiveness and efficiency of
the US private enforcement regime. As a solution to the current litigation
disorder, the Commission proposed a package of amendments consisting of:
1) Legislative overruling of the Illinois Brick doctrine to the extent necessary
for compensation of indirect purchasers under federal law;
2) Legislative overruling of the Hanover Shoe doctrine to the extent necess-
ary for the prevention of multiple recoveries; and
3) Adoption of mechanisms for the removal of state indirect purchaser actions
to the federal courts and consolidation of all related direct and indirect
purchaser actions regarding the same conduct before a single federal
forum so that the same forum could decide on liability and the amount
46 Gavil (n 1) 863; Cavanaugh ibid 30; Prepared Statement of Michael I Denger, before the
Antitrust Modernization Commission, (27 June 2005) 12.
47 F Cengiz, ‘Management of Networks between the Competition Authorities in the US and the
EC: Different Polities, Different Designs’ (2007) 3 European Competition Journal 315, 324–331.
48 Antitrust Modernization Commission Act (n 13).
49 AMC Final Report (n 14) 266. 50 ibid.
51 ibid.
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of passing-on and subsequently apportion the damage fund between the
indirect and direct purchasers.52
There is a significant contrast between the American and European rationales
when it comes to the objectives of private enforcement. The conventional
wisdom in the US perceives effectiveness and efficiency as the main objec-
tives of private antitrust enforcement. The Antitrust Modernization
Commission’s current initiative for a policy change was not provoked by a
shift in such philosophy, but by the chaotic litigation environment created by
diverse standards and weak judicial cooperation mechanisms. In the European
context on the other hand, as clearly confirmed by the European Court of
Justice in Courage and Manfredi, the doctrine of direct effect requires that it
should be ‘open to any individual to claim damages for the loss caused to him
by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition’.53 In other
words, in strong contrast to the US federal policy, categorical elimination of
indirect purchaser standing for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness would
dramatically conflict with the dynamics of the principle of direct effect. In line
with the Court’s approach to the matter, the European Commission adopted a
fairness perspective to antitrust damages actions in its recent White Paper and
declared that ‘full compensation’ of all victims of infringements of EU com-
petition law will be the ‘first and foremost guiding principle’ of private en-
forcement in Europe.54 In the light of such contrast between the American and
European rationales for private antitrust enforcement, policy learning from the
US in the substantive sense does not appear possible let alone plausible.
However, the US experience offers important policy lessons particularly in
terms of the design of procedural aspects of private enforcement in a multi-
level setting. It clearly illustrates that in multi-level polities, particularly when
there is diversity between the substantive standards of constituent jurisdic-
tions, strong judicial cooperation mechanisms, whereby related cases are liti-
gated either by a single forum under a single set of standards or by multiple
forums in close coordination, are indispensable for the private enforcement
regime to succeed. Otherwise, no matter how plausibly the substantive stan-
dards are designed, the result will be a policy failure.
IV. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT I: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS OF INDIRECT PURCHASER
STANDING AND THE PASSING-ON DEFENCE
In its White Paper, referring to Courage and Manfredi as the main sources of
authority, the Commission bravely argues that the jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice requires recognition of indirect purchaser standing by the national
52 ibid 267.
53 Case 453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan ECR [2001] I-6297, para 26; Case C-295/04
Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA ECR [2006] I-06619, para 61 (emphasis
added). 54 White Paper (n 6) 3.
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laws.55 However, as argued elsewhere, it is questionable whether these judg-
ments create a universal right of standing for indirect purchasers at the EU
level which the national laws are obliged to respect.56 To begin with, in
Courage the main question raised by the English national court was not even
related to indirect purchaser standing. Rather, in this case the European Court
of Justice was asked whether a party to the agreement violating article 101
TFEU was entitled to claim damages under EU law. The Court responded to
this question by repeating the general formula of direct effect in the field of
competition law as developed in earlier cases such as BRT Sabam.57 In
Manfredi, on the other hand, the Italian national court raised the question
whether individuals who purchased motor insurance from insurance brokers
and agents were entitled to sue the insurance companies for the damages
caused by a price-fixing conspiracy. In other words, in this case, the European
Court of Justice faced the very specific question of whether the principle of
direct effect requires standing to be granted to indirect purchasers in damages
actions where there has been a violation of article 101 TFEU. In response the
Court observed that, as confirmed in BRT Sabam and Courage, in principle it
must be open to any individual to exercise his rights under the EU law to the
full extent.58 The Court thus held that ‘. . . any individual can claim compen-
sation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between the
harm and agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC [now article
101 TFEU]’.59 However, in its reasoning the Court neither mentioned the
concept of indirect purchaser standing nor went into the specific aspects of
judicial assessment of passing-on. The Court’s reasoning in this case appears
an example of a perfect combination of the principle of direct effect with the
principle of respect of national procedural autonomy. On the one hand the
Court established that national laws should not categorically eliminate indirect
purchaser standing, but on the other, it ruled that it was ultimately for the
national courts to decide who would enjoy standing under the national stan-
dards of causality. Under these circumstances, the Manfredi formula falls
somewhat short of creating an unambiguous European-wide right of standing
for indirect purchasers in damages actions against the violations of articles
101 and 102 TFEU.
The position of EU law is not less complicated when it comes to the
passing-on defence. In the past, the Court faced the question of the passing-
on defence specifically in cases relating to the extra-contractual liability
of the EU60 and monetary liability of the Member States for breaches of EU
55 ibid 4; Staff Working Paper (n 9) 15. 56 Cengiz (n 15) 30.
57 Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 51.
58 Manfredi (n 53) para 26. 59 ibid para 61 (emphasis added).
60 See eg Joined Cases 64 & 113/76, 239/78, 27–28 & 45/79 Dumortier Freres SA and Others
v Council of the European Communities (Maize Gritz Cases) [1979] ECR 3091; Case 238/78
Ireks-Arkady GmbH v Council and Commission of the European Communities (Quellmehl Cases)
[1979] ECR 2955.
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law.61 In both contexts, the Court recognized the existence of passing-on de-
fence. In fact, in the context of extra-contractual liability of the EU, the Court
went even further and analysed statistical pricing data to calculate the amount
of passing-on. Some authors argue that the Court’s jurisprudence in these
contexts implies the existence of a universal passing-on defence under EU
law which is also applicable in the field of antitrust damages actions.62
However, such argument does not seem convincing under the dramatically
different margins of sensitivity of national procedural autonomy in the field
of antitrust damages actions on the one hand and EU and Member State
liability on the other. Although they stem from the doctrine of direct effect,
antitrust damages actions are litigated before the national courts under the
substantive and procedural standards of national laws. Extra-contractual
liability of the EU, on the other hand, is explicitly regulated by the TFEU63
and the European Court of Justice enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in this field.
Likewise, although being adjudicated by national courts, the liability of
Member States in cases of breaches of EU law stems from the doctrine of
direct effect with the very precise objective and subjective conditions of such
liability firmly established in the Court’s jurisprudence.64 In other words, the
margin of sensitivity of national procedural autonomy in the context of anti-
trust damages actions is much tighter than that in the contexts of EU and
Member State liability.
The Court has not yet faced the question of passing-on defence in the
context of damages actions against the violations of EU competition law.
However, in Courage and Manfredi the Court faced the question whether
under the national laws plaintiffs could be denied damages in actions against
the violations of articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU if the award of damages
would result in unjust enrichment. In these cases the Court showed utmost
deference to national procedural autonomy and held that, so long as the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness65 are respected, ‘Community [now
61 See eg Case192/95 Societe Comateb v Directeur General Des Douanes et Droits Indirects
[1997] ECR I-165; Joined Cases 441-42/98 Kapniki Michailidis AE v Idryma Koinonikon
Asfaliseon (IKA) [2000] ECR I-7145.
62 T Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules and Beyond: Reflections on the Utility and Feasibility of Stimulating Private Enforcement
Through Legislative Action’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 431, 474; N Reich,
‘Horizontal Liability in EC Law: Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation in case of
breaches of EC Rights’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 705, 712; see also the Opinion of
Mr Advocate General Van Gerven in Case 390/98 H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal
Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209. 63 Art 340 TFEU.
64 Joined Cases 6 &9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357; Joined Cases 46
&48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of
State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029.
65 Principles of equivalence and effectiveness are EU law principles developed by the Court of
Justice which establish that the national laws governing the actions brought by individuals in
exercise of their directly effective EU rights shall not be less favourable than those governing
similar domestic actions (equivalence) and that they shall not render the exercise of directly
effective EU rights practically impossible or excessively difficult (effectiveness). See Case 33/76
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EU] law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the
protection of the rights guaranteed by the Community [now EU] law does not
entail the unjust enrichment who enjoy them’.66 In other words, in accordance
with the tight margin of national procedural autonomy in the field of antitrust
damages actions, the Court left the question of unjust enrichment to be settled
by the national courts under their respective national laws. Questions of
passing-on defence and unjust enrichment rest on essentially similar ratio-
nales. Both stem from the fairness consideration, although the passing-on
defence concerns whether an individual should be entitled to claim damages
he has not actually incurred, whereas unjust enrichment concerns whether an
individual should be entitled to claim damages under conditions which do not
fully justify the damage award.67 The only practical difference is that passing-
on defence involves technical analysis of much more complex economic and
econometric data by the judiciary. That difference aside, it is not hard to
imagine that the Court of Justice’s position would not be dramatically differ-
ent in the matter of passing-on defence than its position in the matter of unjust
enrichment.
As a conclusion, the Court of Justice seems to have left the questions of
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing to be settled by the
national courts under the national laws. Due to the insufficient number of
antitrust damages actions brought to date, national courts have not yet fully
clarified the positions of national laws on these matters. The Ashurst study
concluded that the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing appear
at least theoretically possible in most of the Member States, however, with
some strong reservations.68 Particularly in jurisdictions where the existence of
a direct causal link between the harm and the harmful conduct is required,
such as Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Malta, indirect pur-
chaser standing could prove problematic.69 For instance, under the ‘protective
purpose of the norm theory’ (Schutznormtheorie), the German and Austrian
national courts have in the past required that the ‘plaintiff be a person or
belong to a definable group of persons against whom the infringement has
specifically been directed’ for damages to be awarded.70 Under this reasoning,
German national courts rejected damage claims by the victims of international
vitamins cartel, whereas such claims were accepted by the English national
courts.71 In 2005, with the 7th amendment, specific rules were incorporated to
Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer fuer das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989; Case 45/76 Comet v
Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043; Case 68/79 Hans Just v Danish Ministry for
Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 501; Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San
Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595. Note that, this principle differs from the ‘consideration of effective-
ness’ discussed in the text at n 15.
66 Courage (n 53) para 30; Manfredi (n 53) para 94.
67 Cengiz (n 15) 32. 68 Comparative Report (n 4) 6.
69 ibid 78. 70 ibid 38.
71 Mainz District Court, decisions of 15 January 15 2004, Cases 12 HK.O 52/02, 12 HK.O 55/
02 and 12 HK.O 56/02 [2004] NJW-RR 478; Mannheim District Court, decision of 11 July 2003,
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the German Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz Gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen-GWB). Under the new rules, lower courts tend
to accept the passing-on defence, whereas the dominant wisdom in German
antitrust community supports its rejection on efficiency grounds.72 Likewise,
after the amendment, indirect purchaser standing in antitrust damages actions
appears problematic in Germany, as the new rules specifically grant standing
only to individuals from the downstream market directly affected by the
anticompetitive agreement or conduct in question.73
In the light of this brief review, it can be concluded as regards the passing-
on defence and indirect purchaser standing the jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice provides insufficient guidance and national laws are as diverse as the
state laws of the US. The European Commission signals that it favours har-
monization of national standards through EU legislation which will recognize
both the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing.74 Although such
proposal of the Commission seems plausible under the lessons drawn from the
US in terms of preventing the inconsistency and multiple recoveries, it
nevertheless raises two significant caveats. Firstly, the Commission is likely to
face some serious national resistance if it takes such legislative initiative.
Some national competition authorities have already emphasized in their res-
ponses to the Commission’s Green Paper that harmonization of national
standards at this stage would be an unacceptable infringement of national
autonomy and would conflict with the principles of subsidiarity and pro-
portionality.75 Likewise, it is argued that full-scale harmonization in the field
of competition law is undesirable as it might result in spill-over effects on
the entire national legal regimes of civil remedies with unforeseen conse-
quences.76 Secondly, the prospect of adoption without resistance aside, it is
Cases 7 O 326/02, published in [2004] GRUR 182; Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, decision of
28 January 2004, Case 6 U 183/03, published in [2004] WuW DER 1229, all cited in C Ryngaert,
‘Foreign-to-Foreign Claims: the US Supreme Court’s Decision (2004) v the English High Court’s
Decision (2003) in the Vitamins Case’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 611, 615.
Compare to Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA; Trouw (UK) Ltd v Rhodia Ltd, Provimi
Ltd v Roche Products Ltd, Trouw (UK) Ltd v Roche Products Ltd. [2003] 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 683.
72 U Boge, K Ost, ‘Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement—The Situation in Germany
and Policy Perspectives’ (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 197, 200.
73 ibid 200–201.
74 White Paper (n 6) 8; Staff Working Paper (n 9) 98.
75 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Response to the European Commission’s Green paper, Damages
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ (2006)<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/
oft_response_to_consultations/oft844.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009, 2; Comments of the
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel Office on the Green paper
of the EU Commission, 1–2.
76 F Marcos, and A Sánchez Graells, ‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages actions for
breach of the EC antitrust rules: harmonising Tort Law through the back door?’ presented at the
IV International Congress of European Private Law Beyond the CFR, Lleida (Spain), 25–26
October 2007 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028963> accessed 28
September 2009; F Cengiz and K Wright, ‘Strategies for a European Judicial Network From the
Perspective of Competition Policy’ presented at the UACES Conference, Exchanging Ideas on
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questionable whether harmonization of national standards alone would pro-
vide a sufficient safeguard against a potential litigation chaos producing in-
consistent judgments and multiple recoveries. The Commission intends not
only to invigorate indirect and direct purchaser damages actions but also to
strengthen redress mechanisms for consumers, such as opt-in class actions and
damages actions brought by representative entities on behalf of consumers.77
Although the measures proposed by the Commission are compatible with the
protection of consumer welfare rationale of competition policy, they poten-
tially open doors for the very same anticompetitive behaviour being litigated
through various parallel indirect and direct purchaser actions. Under this
complex litigation scenario, procedural aspects of damages actions and co-
operation between national courts will gain utmost importance even in the
presence of harmonisation of national standards. The lessons drawn from the
US suggest that in order to avoid inconsistency and multiple recoveries in
such a complex litigation environment, a single court or multiple courts in
coordination should adjudicate related parallel actions under a single standard,
rule on the amount of passing-on and apportion the damage fund between
various plaintiffs. This brings into question the EU standards of jurisdiction,
conflicts of laws (particularly in the case of failure of the Commission’s
efforts at harmonisation), removal and consolidation of cases before a single
court and the mechanisms for judicial cooperation.
V. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT II: CURRENT PROCEDURAL STANDARDS AND UNADDRESSED
QUESTIONS
In the EU, the issue of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters is governed
by the Brussels I Regulation78 which is also applicable in cases of conflicts
regarding the violations of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As a general rule, the
Brussels Regulation determines the domicile of the defendant as the main
forum of jurisdiction.79 However, the Regulation also attributes alternative
jurisdiction to various forums which may come into play in cases involving
violations of EU competition rules. Firstly, in matters of tort, delict or quasi-
delict, the courts where the harmful event occurred, or may occur, enjoy
alternative jurisdiction.80 The Court of Justice interprets this alternative rule
of jurisdiction in a broad manner so as to confer jurisdiction on the courts of
the place where the damage occurred as well as the courts of the place where
Europe 2008 Rethinking the European Union, 1–3 September 2008,<http://www.uaces.org/pdf/
papers/0801/2008_Cengiz.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009, 9.
77 White Paper (n 6) 4; Staff Working Paper (n 9) 19–21, 98; Impact Assessment Report
(n 9) 57.
78 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter ‘Brussels I
Regulation’) [2001] OJ L 12/1. 79 ibid art 2(1).
80 ibid art 5(3).
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the event giving rise to it took place.81 Likewise, the position of the Court
regarding jurisdiction in cases of libel through press suggests by analogy that
in a hypothetical violation of the EU competition rules, indirect and direct
purchasers would be able to bring damages actions before the courts of the
Member States where the product which is the subject of the violation is
distributed and sold.82 Secondly, in Member States where criminal remedies
are foreseen for the violations of competition law, the criminal court seised
may also claim jurisdiction for the adjudication of damages actions regarding
the violation to the extent that national law gives jurisdiction to such courts
over commercial and civil matters.83 Thirdly, in disputes regarding operations
of a branch, agency or establishment, the Brussels Regulation confers
alternative jurisdiction on the courts of the place where such branch, agency or
establishment is situated.84 Last but not least, a defendant may be sued in the
courts of the place where any of the defendants reside provided that the claims
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them to-
gether to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings.85 Considering that most violations of articles 101 and 102 TFEU
affect various geographical markets, involve various co-conspirators, bran-
ches and subsidiaries and harm a large number of indirect and direct pur-
chasers dispersed around Europe, it is not hard to imagine that under the
current standards of jurisdiction a hypothetical anticompetitive activity of
medium scale would give rise to multiple parallel actions brought before
various national forums.
The Brussels Regulation foresees rules of lis pendens for removal and
consolidation of related cases before a single judicial forum. According
to such rules, the court first seised enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in related
actions, and consequently other courts are obliged to decline jurisdiction in
favour of such court only in proceedings involving the same cause of action
and the same parties.86 On the other hand, national courts enjoy discretion to
decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised when cases litigated
before multiple courts are ‘so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments result-
ing from separate proceedings’.87 As indirect and direct purchaser damages
actions would potentially involve different plaintiffs and also different
81 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G J Bier BV v Mines de potasse d‘Alsace SA [1976] ECR
1735, para.11.
82 Case 68/93 Fiona Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415.
83 Brussels I Regulation (n 78) art 5(4).
84 ibid art 5(5). The Court of Justice’s broad interpretation of this provision suggests by ana-
logy that this provision would also apply to the acts of subsidiaries in the context of competition
law infringements. See eg Case 33/78 Somafer v Saar-Ferngas [1978] ECR 2183; Case 439/93
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v Campenon Bernard [1995] ECR I-961.
85 Brussels I Regulation (n 78) art 6(1). For liberal interpretation of this provision by an
English court see Provimi (n 71). 86 Brussels I Regulation, ibid art 27.
87 ibid art 28(3).
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defendants particularly in the context of anticompetitive agreements, the rules
of lis pendens do not strictly prevent parallel litigation of related cases before
multiple national courts. In the past, some national courts considered matters
such as the extent of relatedness, the stage reached in each sets of proceedings,
and the proximity of each court seised to the subject-matter of the case in the
exercise of their discretion as to whether or not to suspend their proceedings
and decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised.88 Additionally,
exercise of such discretion and consequent suspension of proceedings requires
information exchange mechanisms between the courts through which parallel
cases adjudicated by other national courts are brought into the attention of all
courts seised in related matters. Although the general logic suggests that it
would be in the interest of the defendant to alert the courts and initiate removal
to avoid litigation costs arising from parallel proceedings, it might not always
be the case in antitrust damages actions. For instance, the White Paper does
not propose harmonization of national civil remedies against anticompetitive
behaviour, and in the presence of diversity of such remedies adjudication of
related damages actions before a single court might not be in the defendant’s
interest if the law applied by that court foresees imposition of punitive da-
mages. Under these circumstances, information exchange between the judi-
ciary and judicial dialogue appears of utmost importance for the effective
operation of the rules of lis pendens.
If the Commission’s efforts at harmonization fail, in the presence of di-
versity between the national standards, rules of conflicts of laws will gain
crucial importance for the prevention of inconsistency and multiple recoveries
in parallel direct and indirect purchaser damages actions. The Rome II
Regulation,89 which came into force in January 2009, determines the rules of
conflicts of laws in non-contractual matters in the EU. The Regulation fore-
sees a special rule for cases involving restrictions of competition and declares
that in such cases ‘the law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be,
affected’ shall apply.90 The Rome II Regulation has been in force for nearly a
year now, and to the author’s knowledge the Court of Justice has not yet found
the opportunity to clarify this special rule of conflict of laws. However, given
that an anticompetitive agreement or practice must affect trade between the
Member States in the first place for articles 101 and 102 TFEU to apply, it is
not hard to imagine that under the current standard of conflict of laws multiple
national laws would come into play in a hypothetical network of related
88 P Stone, EU Private International Law (Elgar European Law, Cheltenham, 2006) 100.
89 Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (hereinafter ‘Rome II Regulation’)
[2007] OJ L 199/40.
90 ibid art 6(3)(a). According to art 6(3)(b) in cases where multiple national laws come into
play, the plaintiff has the choice to employ lex fori (the law of the forum) instead, provided that
such forum is the domicile of the defendant and among the markets affected by the violation in
question. However, since under the current standards of jurisdiction multiple defendants are likely
to bring parallel cases in multiple forums, this provision falls short of solving the problem.
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actions brought by direct and indirect purchasers against the same anti-
competitive activity.
This brief review shows that under the current EU rules of procedure, the
very same violation of articles 101 and 102 TFEU might give rise to various
parallel actions adjudicated by multiple forums under multiple substantive
standards. Under these circumstances, coordinated adjudication of related
cases appears as the only possible mechanism for prevention of inconsistency
and multiple recoveries. Likewise, the current rules of lis pendens leave the
issue of removal and consolidation of cases largely to the discretion of the
courts and presuppose the existence of information exchange mechanisms
between them. In addition to these practical considerations, judicial dialogue
is of crucial importance for the emergence of a common competition litigation
culture and harmonized jurisprudence across Europe through voluntary judi-
cial action. Since the 1999 Tampere Summit,91 various measures have been
adopted for the smooth operation of cross-border litigation in the European
Union,92 which include inter alia the Council decision of 2001 establishing a
judicial network in civil and commercial matters.93 These measures enable
national courts to exchange judicial and extra-judicial materials, collect evi-
dence including witness depositions on behalf of each other and exchange
such information through central receiving and transmitting authorities ap-
pointed by the Member States. The judicial network, however, does not
comprise national courts themselves but rather central contact points desig-
nated by the Member States. The network is at an embryonic stage and its only
notable success so far has been cutting ‘the time taken to process requests’ for
the exchange of materials ‘via its direct relations between the contact
points’.94 In other words, the existing EU measures do not provide mechan-
isms for direct dialogue between the national courts.
The White Paper addresses neither the procedural aspects of private anti-
trust enforcement nor judicial cooperation. It assumes that the existing EU
measures provide sufficient safeguard against inconsistency and multiple re-
coveries and consequently, it limits itself to calling for national courts to make
91 At the 1999 Tampere Summit, the European Council reiterated the goal of creating a Union
of freedom, security and justice and firmly established that action would be taken at the EU level
to facilitate judicial cooperation as a means of achieving this goal. See the Presidential
Conclusions of Tampere Council, 15–16 October 1999. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
summits/tam_en.htm> accessed 28 September 2009.
92 Council Regulation (EC) 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the Service in the Member States of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters [2000] OJ L 160/37;
Council Regulation (EC) 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on Cooperation between the Member States
in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial matters [2001] OJ L 174/1.
93 Council Decision (2001/470/EC of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network
in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L 174/25.
94 Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European
Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Decision 2001/470/EC estab-
lishing a European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters COM(2006) 203 final,
16.5.2006, 5.
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full use of such measures ‘in the case of joint, parallel or consecutive actions
brought by purchasers at different points in the distribution chain’.95 Instead
of strengthening links among the national courts, the Commission follows a
rather different strategy in the White Paper and proposes measures to
strengthen links between the national courts and competition authorities in
order to obtain greater consistency. Most notably, the Commission suggests
that final and positive decisions of national competition authorities be given
binding force in subsequent damages actions across Europe regarding the
same anticompetitive activity.96 Besides raising the very sensitive question of
judicial independence, it is unclear how such a measure would protect con-
sistency in cases of parallel indirect and direct purchaser actions which in-
volve technical questions such as calculation of passing-on and distribution of
damages between plaintiffs which the national competition authorities do not
necessarily address in their decisions. Nor does the general judicial dialogue
between national courts and the European Court of Justice under the pre-
liminary rulings mechanism97 appear sufficient for the prevention of incon-
sistency and multiple recoveries in the context of antitrust damages actions.
Firstly, if the Commission’s efforts at harmonization fail, national courts will
not be able to direct specific questions of passing-on to the Court of Justice,
given that the preliminary rulings mechanism can only be initiated as regards
questions of EU law: in the absence of harmonization, questions of passing-on
will continue to be regulated by national laws. Secondly, the preliminary
rulings mechanism is designed to maintain dialogue between the Court of
Justice and national courts inter se, and therefore, even in the case of harmo-
nization it would not be well suited for initiation of dialogue between national
courts for the resolution of technical aspects of parallel damages actions in a
consistent manner.
Under this analysis, the lack of assessment of the procedural aspects of
antitrust damages actions in the White Paper appears a strategic mistake. In
order to prevent the emergence of a chaotic litigation environment such as
resulted in a policy failure in the US, the Commission should asses the current
EU standards of procedure and possible strategies to improve those standards
in the context of antitrust damages actions before taking any legislative ini-
tiative.
The first question which the Commission must address is whether it would
be plausible to amend the Brussels I Regulation to adopt a special rule of
95 White Paper (n 6) 8.
96 ‘The Commission suggests the following rule: national courts that have to rule in actions for
damages on practices under art 81 and 82 on which an NCA [national competition authority] in
the ECN [European competition network] has already given a final decision finding an infringe-
ment of those articles, or on which a review court has given a final judgment upholding the NCA
decision or itself finding an infringement, cannot take decisions running counter to any such
decision or ruling.’ (emphasis in original) ibid 6.
97 Article 267 TFEU.
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jurisdiction for antitrust damages actions so that related direct and indirect
purchaser actions are adjudicated by a single court. If the Commission reaches
a positive conclusion regarding this question after its assessment, work allo-
cation rules of the European Competition Network (ECN), which was formed
between the European Commission and the national competition authorities,
could be taken as a model in the formulation of such special rule. These work
allocation rules determine the competition authority with the closest ‘material
link’ to the violation in question as a well-placed authority to investigate
violations of articles 101 and 102 TFEU.98 Such a material link is deemed
to exist when three cumulative conditions are met: first, when the anti-
competitive activity in question has substantial effects on competition within
the territory of the competition authority, or is implemented within or origi-
nates from its territory; second, when the authority is able to bring the entire
infringement to an end effectively; and third, when it can gather, possibly with
the assistance of other authorities, the evidence required to prove the in-
fringement.99 A special rule of jurisdiction for antitrust damages actions de-
signed along the same lines would attribute jurisdiction to the national court
with the closest geographical connection to the victims of the violation, the
market in question, and evidence to prove liability and calculate the amount
of passing-on. Consequently, it would satisfy the considerations of fairness,
effectiveness and efficiency at the same time.100 Additionally, the
Modernisation Regulation provides a mechanism for cooperation between the
national courts and competition authorities whereby competition authorities
may submit written and oral observations to the national courts regarding
application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU.101 If the rule of jurisdiction in
antitrust damages actions is designed under the suggested formula, public and
private enforcement efforts against the same violation would overlap in the
same Member State in most cases. In such case, cooperation between the
national courts and competition authorities would also function more effec-
tively, and competition authorities could ease the burden of national courts by
providing information and evidence for the resolution of the technical aspects
of antitrust damages actions such as the calculation of passing-on.
The second question which the Commission must address is whether it
would be desirable and plausible to amend the Rome II Regulation in order to
further define the rule of conflict of laws and appoint a single national law as
the applicable law in the context of antitrust damages actions. Particularly in
98 The work allocation rules of the ECN, however are regulated by a soft-law measure, and
therefore are subject to the discretion of national competition authorities. See Commission Notice
on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C 101/43,
2.1.Principles of Allocation. 99 ibid para 8.
100 This rule would not conflict with the principle of procedural fairness either, as procedural
fairness requires protection of the weaker party of the conflict in question which happens to be the
plaintiff (rather than the defendant as usual) in the context of antitrust damages actions, in par-
ticular in indirect purchaser actions.
101 Modernisation Regulation (n 2) art 15(3).
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the event of the failure of the Commission’s efforts at harmonization, the
application of a single set of standards in parallel actions will gain crucial
importance for consistency in antitrust damages actions. If the Commission
reaches a positive conclusion regarding this question after its assessment, the
most plausible strategy would be designation of the law of country with the
closest material link with the violation in question as the applicable law, in
line with the rule of jurisdiction suggested above. Under such formulation, the
national court of jurisdiction would apply its own national law (lex fori), in
other words the law with which it is most familiar. Additionally, under such
formulation the law of the country of jurisdiction would in most cases corres-
pond with the law of the country where the harmful event occurred (lex loci
delicti commissi), and as a result, the application of conflicts of tort laws rules
would not be disturbed.
The third question which the Commission must address concerns possible
strategies for the improvement of judicial cooperation and dialogue between
national courts inter se. Currently, there are strong links connecting the
national courts to the EU institutions and to the national competition autho-
rities in the context of antitrust damages actions. Apart from the preliminary
rulings procedure, whereby national courts direct their questions regarding
interpretation of the EU competition rules to the Court of Justice, under the
Modernisation Regulation the Commission may employ a variety of me-
chanisms such as amicus curiae briefs and oral and written observations to
clarify technical aspects of EU competition law before the national courts.102
Additionally, as mentioned above, under the Modernisation Regulation
national competition authorities also enjoy channels of communication with
the national courts.103 In contrast, the current structure of the European judi-
cial network does not provide direct communication between national courts
inter se. However, besides being of crucial importance for the development of
a common culture and jurisprudence of antitrust litigation across Europe,
dialogue and communication between national courts carries indispensable
practical value for consistent adjudication of antitrust damages actions. For
instance, under the current rules of procedure, effective utilisation of rules of
lis pendens requires information exchange between the national courts. From
this perspective, the Commission should assess possible ways of improving
the European judicial network so as to provide direct communication between
the courts. Again, some aspects of the ECN could be taken as a model in such
quest. For instance, in the context of the ECN, competition authorities enter
into direct communication with each other through an interactive database
where new investigations are registered with essential information regarding
102 Modernisation Regulation (n 2) art 15, see also Commission Notice (EC) on the co-
operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of
EC Treaty arts 81 and 82, [2004] OJ C101/54, paras 15–35.
103 See text to (n 101).
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the subject of the investigation.104 This information can be tracked by other
competition authorities and is updated once the authority conducting the in-
vestigation takes a final decision.105 Creation of such a database in the context
of the European judicial network would provide a foundation for the emerg-
ence of direct communication between the national courts and support effec-
tive utilisation of rules of lis pendens by alerting national courts to parallel
damages actions regarding the same anticompetitive activity taking place
across the EU.106
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Actions for damages constitute an essential pillar of modern antitrust regimes,
as these actions deter anticompetitive activity and provide redress to con-
sumers. Therefore, the European Commission’s efforts to invigorate damages
actions before national courts for violations of EU competition law are wel-
come. Likewise, the choice of full compensation particularly for final con-
sumers as the main objective of the European private enforcement regime is
compatible with the protection of consumer welfare rationale of modern
antitrust philosophy. However, as the American experience of indirect pur-
chaser litigation strongly illustrates, in multi-level polities, procedural stan-
dards and mechanisms of judicial cooperation are as important as the
substantive standards for the success of private enforcement regimes. From
this perspective, the lack of procedural assessment in the White Paper appears
a strategic mistake. The Commission should consider the current EU stan-
dards of jurisdiction, conflicts of laws and judicial cooperation and possible
strategies to improve these standards before taking any legislative action.
Although the Commission’s hesitance to touch upon these questions owing to
their close connection with national procedural autonomy is understandable,
some proposals of the Commission, most notably those on substantive har-
monization and attributing binding force to the decisions of competition
authorities, are no less controversial from the perspective of national pro-
cedural autonomy.
104 This database is called ‘ECN Interactive’. The information is supplied by national com-
petition authorities under Modernisation Regulation, (n 2) art 11.
105 Under the Modernisation Regulation Member States are under a duty to submit to the
Commission copies of the national court decisions applying articles 101 and 102 TFEU. See
Modernisation Regulation, ibid, art 15(2). The Commission publishes those decisions on its
website <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/elojade/antitrust/nationalcourts/> accessed 28
September 2009. However, this mechanism is not suitable to alert the courts about the parallel
cases litigated before other national courts, since only final judgments are communicated to and
published by the Commission. Additionally, some studies reveal that the current database of
national judgments is incomplete. See Kathryn Wright, ‘European Commission Opinions to
National Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application and the Judicial-Administrative
Relationship’ (2008) ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper 08-24, <http://
www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104682!ccp08-24.pdf> accessed 28 September 2009.
106 Cengiz and Wright (n 76) 11.
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